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
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THE IMMEDIATE TASKS
of the
INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION MOVEMENT

by
O. Piatnitsky

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I.—ON THE EVE OF THE FIFTH CONGRESS OF THE RED INTERNATIONAL OF LABOUR UNIONS.

Independent Leadership of Economic Struggles.

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The question of independent leadership of economic struggles, not only by independent Red trade unions, but by Communist fractions in the trade unions, and in the organisations of the trade union minority movement and trade union opposition, despite all efforts to prevent such independent leadership on the part of reformist trade union leaders, occupied the central position in all decisions of the IVth Congress of R.I.L.U. and in the IXth E.C.C.I. Plenum resolution on the trade union question.

For the fulfilment of this most important task, the IXth E.C.C.I. Plenum resolution on the trade union question and the IVth Congress of the R.I.L.U. recommended that Communist parties and trade union organisations launch preliminary campaigns among broad masses of organised and unorganised workers in those branches of industry, and particularly in the most important enterprises, where economic conflicts are imminent, in order to ensure the election by the workers themselves under the guidance by the Communist parties of strike committees for the conduct of the coming struggles. How have these decisions been carried out by, at least, the European sections of the Comintern and R.I.L.U. during the interval of the last two and a half years between the IVth and Vth Congresses of the R.I.L.U.? Before answering this cardinal question, we must consider, even though briefly, the rôle of the reformist, Catholic and other reactionary trade unions in the strike struggles during this period.

If, after the world war, the reformist trade unions found it sometimes necessary to resort to strikes, this was due to the fact that, as a result of mass dismissals and a considerable lengthening of the working day, a wave of spontaneous indignation swept through the broad trade union masses.

Of such a nature were, for instance, the general railwaymen's strike in Germany in 1922, the general strike and lockout of the miners in England in 1926, the miners' strike in Sweden in 1928, etc. Even these strikes failed to end in complete victory for the workers; the reformists made foul compromises or completely smashed the strike (English miners' lockout). Immediately that capitalist rationalisation was launched with the help

of, and even led by, the trade union bureaucrats, even this form of " leadership " of economic struggles ceased completely. Open strike breaking began.

When the workers themselves began to leave their jobs in a desperate attempt to fight against worsened conditions, striking against wage cuts (as in the recent woollen textileworkers' strike in England and the Mansfield metalworkers' struggle in Germany), or when the workers inside the factories began to prepare for a strike and to draw up their demands for better labour conditions and increased wages (textile workers' strike in München-Gladbach, the Ruhr metalworkers' strike of 1928, the German tailors' strike in 1930), then the trade union bureaucrats headed the strikes in order to betray them by means of compulsory arbitration. The trade union bureaucrats of all countries, utilising the world economic crisis, are now doing their utmost to prevent strikes, by agreeing to lowered wages, increased hours, worsened labour conditions, dismissals of hundreds and thousands of workers, and the introduction of heavier, more sweated forms of capitalist rationalisation.

The recent strikes (woollen textileworkers in England, Mansfield workers, the Ruhr movement) broke out despite the efforts of the trade union bureaucrats; under pressure from below the trade union on organisations have been forced to pay their members strike money (at the beginning of the woollen textileworkers strike in England, and in Mansfield), which indicates clearly the fighting spirit of the proletariat, which despite the enormous unemployment, has no intention of allowing its economic position to be made worse, without a fight. But the reformists, forming a united front with the owners and State apparatus, were able to liquidate the strike movement (Mansfield workers in Germany and woollen textileworkers in England) in the interests of capital, and the wages of 250,000 metalworkers in the Ruhr were lowered without even any serious struggle on the part of the workers themselves, who (213,000 workers and women) at the end of 1928, so heroically resisted the employers.

The trade union opposition and the Communist Party of Germany were able to bring out only insignificant sections of the workers to fight against lowering of wages, even though they had launched a strong campaign among the metalworkers of the Ruhr. This is due to the fact that the reformist and Catholic trade union bureaucrats (the Social-Democratic party and the Catholic centre party are still fairly strong in the Ruhr) mobilised all their forces to disorganise the Ruhr metalworkers, and prevent their defending even their previous rate of wages; for had the Ruhr metalworkers gained a victory, the owners of

the metallurgical industry throughout Germany would have been unable to lower wages.

The trade union bureaucrats have still sufficient means to prevent the workers fighting. Moreover, besides the fact that they bring pressure to bear on their members through the trade union apparatus, they refuse to pay strike money from the strike funds, and this although their trade union members have been accustomed for decades to receiving strike pay during strikes. The position is not much better in countries where there exist independent red trade unions (France, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, etc.). In these countries also, in one and the same factory it is possible to find members of several trade unions differing in aim. In Czechoslovakia, for example, until quite recently there were 13 different federations of trade unions, and in France, besides the red, there are reformist and anarcho-syndicalist trade unions (the latter without any considerable membership following), etc.

Furthermore, inside the factories there are innumerable separate craft organisations — metalworkers, woodworkers, machinists, general workers, etc.—so that even in the red trade unions we find no real organisation on industrial union lines. During strikes, the trade unions of various kinds pull in different directions, which considerably complicates the work of leadership, and makes it difficult to bring a big strike to a successful conclusion.

The trade unions of France are in a somewhat better situation, for there scarcely more than 8 per cent. of the workers are organised in trade unions of every kind (in France there are about 12 million workers and employees; about one million are organised); finally, up to now in France the world economic crisis is not* felt to such a degree as it is in America, England and Germany. But in these countries (Czecho-Slovakia, France) the red trade unions during strikes come up against the treachery of the various trade unions, and especially against the refined treachery of the Amsterdam clique. This is why the Communist press so frequently writes about heroic strikes led by the Communists in various countries and finally has to put on record that " such and such a strike was lost because of the treachery of the reformists." This is why the Communist parties of capitalist countries, which receive millions of votes at Parliamentary and municipal elections, and which during revolutionary demonstrations bring out hundreds of thousands of working men and women on to the streets, have up to now been unable to organise, lead and bring to victory not only the economic strikes

* The article was written in the summer of 1930.—Ed.

of a single branch of industry, or of an industrial district, but of even one large town.

The Test of Practice.

The decisions of the Comintern and the R.I.L.U. concerning the independent leadership of economic struggles in the sense of concrete preparation and concrete leadership have not on the whole yet been realised in practice, although there have been noteworthy achievements in this direction. The chief shortcoming of the red unions and the revolutionary trade union opposition is that they have not yet learned how concretely to prepare, to organise and to lead the struggle for the day-to-day economic interests of the working masses. A glance at the movement of economic struggles in capitalist Europe during the last two years will demonstrate this.

The Communist Party of Germany and the German trade union opposition has still not been able concretely to prepare, organise, and lead to victory the big strikes.

The offensive of 45,000 textileworkers in München-Gladbach at the end of 1928 was begun without any preparation on the part of the trade union opposition (the movement began unexpectedly for the latter). The leadership remained in the hands of the reformists, for the trade union opposition did not even arrange for the election of strike committees by the workers themselves. Nevertheless, the trade union opposition was able to acquire an influence on the strike; in particular it was able to get the arbitration decision turned down at the factory conferences, despite the efforts of the reformists to pass it.

Similarly, the movement of shipbuilding workers in Hamburg, Kiel and other coastal towns began without any preparation on the part of the trade union opposition, although in this strike the trade union opposition was not only able to get strike committees elected, but called together a conference of representatives of all strike committees of the coastal towns. The trade union opposition first prevented the acceptance by the workers of the arbitration decisions which were in favour of the owners, but was not able, it proved too weak, to prevent the reformists betraying the strike.

At the same time (November—December, 1928) there broke out the strike, which afterwards developed into a lockout of 213,000 Ruhr metalworkers. The trade union opposition actually led this mighty movement, which had broken out spontaneously. It got together all the revolutionary elements from among the organised and unorganised workers. But nevertheless it failed to keep up the struggle after the announcement of the final arbitration decision, passed by the Social-Democratic Minister of Home Affairs, Severing.

Finally, in the new wave of strike struggles in the Spring and Summer of 1930, we see the same picture. Neither in Mansfield, nor in the Ruhr, nor in the strike of 10,000 garment workers (Spring, 1930) did the trade union opposition prepare for the struggle, despite the fact that the corresponding leading organs had been given instructions nine months previously to begin immediate preparations for the renewal of the collective agreements which fell due during 1930 affecting several millions of workers, including more than half a million metalworkers. It is the more important to mention this since in Mansfield and the Ruhr the organised workers who, in 1928, had taken no part in the struggle, had also been drawn into the movement, and in Mansfield the unemployed were demonstrating side by side with the striking workers.

The fighting spirit of the masses in all these struggles was very high, the reformists were compelled to manœuvre, and the work of the opposition, wherever it was actively carried on, gave immediate positive results. It was just because the trade union opposition had taken over the leadership of the strike, that the employers in Mansfield were unable to lower wages to the extent that they intended.

The position is still worse with the Minority Movement in Britain. The trade union opposition in Germany has been able to organise around itself organised and unorganised workers, to publish and distribute widely its publications, to create an organisation in the centre and the provinces—side by side and opposed to the existing reformist trade unions—and to organise independently the re-election of Factory Committees and participate in strikes with hundreds of thousands of striking workers.

There is nothing of the kind in the British Minority Movement. It is still an organisation of leading elements, without broad strong links with the organised members of the trade unions and unorganised working men and women. Until quite recently it had only made very slight preparations for economic struggles. It is enough to mention the complete passivity of the Minority Movement during the strike of 500,000 textileworkers against cuts in wages immediately upon the advent to power of MacDonald.

The first successful attempt to interfere in a large economic conflict was the recent woollen workers' strike. Strike committees were organised in the factories, a central strike committee was created which kept in touch with the local factory strike committees, pickets of strikers were organised to prevent blackleging, meetings were frequently held, leaflets distributed.

The Minority Movement and the British Communist Party mobilised a considerable force to lead the workers during the

movement. Nevertheless, the reformists were able to betray it. The Communist Party of Great Britain and the National Committee of the Minority Movement were not able to mobilise the broad masses of workers around this heroic strike. But we already have the successful beginnings of a broad movement in the future. The ties established during this strike must be followed up and strengthened.

The Communist fractions or trade union opposition in other countries where there are no independent Red trade unions (Austria, Belgium, Holland, etc.), are little active and during this period have carried on no large independent economic strikes.

The work of Communist fractions or the trade union opposition in countries where Red trade unions exist is negligible. In France, the Communist Party and the Red trade unions do no work at all in the reformist trade unions, although there are about half a million workers and employees organised in them. In Czecho-Slovakia, previous to the Hais split in the Red trade unions and before the Rights were thrown out of the Party, there were about 8,000 Communists in the reformist trade unions. At present the attention it deserves is not paid to this work.

Fulfilling the R.I.L.U. Decisions.

How were the instructions concerning the independent leadership of economic struggles carried out in these countries?

France during the last few years stands out above all other countries for its abundance of strikes (over 1,000 strikes a year) with hundreds of thousands of participants. Strikes break out in one town after another and in one industry after another. The reformists, of course, neither prepare for, nor lead these strikes. If they do put themselves at the head of a strike, it is for the purpose of betraying it. Unfortunately, the Red trade unions also make no preparations for economic struggles. In the majority of cases, strikes break out spontaneously, and after they have already begun the Red trade unions clumsily and indecisively, and not infrequently only after being urged ahead by the masses in the Red trade unions or even the unorganised workers, take over the leadership.

There have been cases where representatives of Red trade unions have urged the workers to remain at work, and the latter have been known to appeal to the Party Committees for the removal of such Red trade union representatives. The Central Committee of the French Communist Party and the Red trade union leaders confess that the strike movement has gone on over their heads. And yet, if the Red trade unions and the French Communist Party (if only its trade union section) were to attend properly to questions connected with the economic situation of the French workers, they would sooner

or later realise that the workers, urged on by the financial measures of the Government (stabilisation of the currency, introduction of new taxation upon employees, rise in prices of the necessities of life, etc.) and the introduction of capitalist rationalisation, would put forward demands for increased wages and changed conditions inside the factories; for France is still the only country where there is not yet a large number of unemployed.

The Communist Party of France and the Red trade unions could in advance draw up a list of demands for various industries, towns and districts, and popularise them among the workers, prepare the struggle and lead it. The struggle would then be less disjointed than it has been up to now, for the strike movement in France has spread all over the country in a purely spontaneous form. Take, for instance, the movement of protest against the Social Insurance Law. Over 100,000 workers in various parts of France went on strike spontaneously. This spontaneous, powerful extension of the fighting front is quite a new thing for France.

The campaign against this Law began on a large scale after it had been passed. Had the French Communist Party and the Red trade unions, before the enactment by the French Chamber of Social Insurance at the workers' own expense, worked out their own draft-bill to cover all forms of Social Insurance for workers and employees, the cost being laid upon the owners and the State, and if at the same time they had launched a prolonged, energetic, broad campaign—it would have been possible to mobilise the masses around their draft and against the Government bill; it would have been possible, perhaps, to organise an enormous strike of protest, and throw out of the movement the reformists, who only cling to it in order the more easily to throttle it.

Had the French Red trade unions more carefully prepared the strikes and led them better, they would have been able to aim a deadly blow at the reformist trade unions and to increase considerably the membership of the Red trade unions from amongst the membership of the reformist unions and of the unorganised workers.

It must be emphasised that the French Communist Party and the Red trade unions, nevertheless, led more independent strikes, and led them with more success for the strikers, than other European sections of the R.I.L.U. and the Comintern.

Ideologically, the Comintern and R.I.L.U. sections have already recognised the need for waging economic warfare against and in spite of the reformists. Moreover, the German Communist Party and the trade union opposition were able to interfere with success in important spontaneous strikes or lockouts declared

by the employers and to give considerable assistance to the fighting workers.

The French Communist Party and Red trade unions were even able to prepare and lead strikes, *but all this is absolutely insufficient for the present period of world economic crisis, which sharpens all the inner and outer contradictions of imperialism, and of the revolutionary upsurge of the working class movement.*

In none of the large capitalist countries have the Communist International and R.I.L.U. sections yet succeeded in delivering a crushing blow at the social-Fascist trade union bureaucracy, liberating the working masses from its influence and thus making it impossible for the trade union bureaucrats to wreck those strikes which are prepared for and led by the Red trade unions, the Communist fractions and Red oppositions inside the reformist trade unions.

Tasks of the Vth Congress of the R.I.L.U.

Thus, the chief task of the Vth Congress of the R.I.L.U. must be to show to its sections, to the members of the Red trade unions and the revolutionary workers how to prepare and lead economic strikes *against the will* of the reformists and other treacherous trade union leaders, so that they cannot betray and wreck them.

Until the organised and unorganised workers are freed from the influence of the Social Democrats and their reformist trade union bureaucrats, from the influence of other bourgeois parties and their trade unions (Catholic, Christian, National-Socialist, to which still adhere considerable numbers of workers), the Communist International and R.I.L.U sections will be unable to lead the economic struggles of the proletariat independently and successfully, and to raise these struggles to a higher level, to win over the majority of the working class and overthrow the bourgeoisie. To do this, it is essential that the Communist International and R.I.L.U. sections in deeds, not in words, reorganise their ranks, and shift the centre of gravity of their work to the factories and the places where large numbers of unemployed gather together (Labour Exchanges and Relieving Offices). It is essential that they occupy themselves seriously, side by side with their general revolutionary struggle, with the day-to-day " drudgery," work which is necessary and quite understandable to the masses in the factories and workshops; they must patiently and stubbornly unmask the Social Democrats and trade union bureaucrats, utilising for this purpose facts known and understood by the masses concerning the daily betrayal of the interests of the working class by the Social Democrats and the trade union reformist apparatus. Despite the

fact that all these elementary truths are to be found in all the resolutions of the Congresses and Plenums of the R.I.L.U. and Communist International—trade union questions were examined at the VIth, VIIth, IXth and Xth Plenums of the E.C.C.I. and the enlarged presidium of the E.C.C.I. in February this year—they have to be repeated again at the Vth R.I.L.U. Congress, for the sections of the Communist International and R.I.L.U. have still done very little to carry these elementary truths into effect.

A year has passed since the Xth Plenum of the E.C.C.I. summed up the first experience of the independent leadership of economic struggles by the various Parties and made most important decisions on the trade union question; and yet the Communist International and R.I.L.U. sections have still taken no serious steps to put these decisions into practice. This has been reflected in all spheres of trade union work.

1. The Red trade unions are still not organised on the industrial principle and are still not based on the factories (in the form of Factory Committees or shop steward institutions).

2. Communists organised into Communist fractions are still not to be found in all reformist, Catholic and other trade unions. (Among responsible workers in the R.I.L.U. there is a feeling going round that in countries where Red trade unions do not exist and where Communists are members of reformist trade unions, it is essential that a trade union opposition be created, since the Communist fractions cannot yet fulfil the important tasks facing the revolutionary trade union movement. These comrades know full well that Communist fractions are still not formed either in the Red or the reformist unions to any serious extent, despite the numerous decisions of the Communist International and R.I.L.U. on the subject.)

This contrasting of Communist fractions to the trade union opposition is incorrect, for the foundation, the kernel of the trade union opposition (and the Red trade unions) can only be the Communist fraction. We must help to create real Communist fractions in all trade unions, and not introduce confusion.

3. We still find the movement divided into spheres of influence; sections of the Communist International and local Party organisations occupy themselves with politics, and the trade unions, Communist fractions and the trade union opposition engage in economic struggles, with the result that because of the lack of Party leadership and Party control the Red trade unions and the trade union opposition can easily make opportunist and " left "-sectarian mistakes, for which the Communist Party has to pay; and instead of increased, strengthened influence, we get the opposite (elections of Factory Committees in twenty of the biggest factories in Germany, the tactics of the

Red trade unions in Czecho-Slovakia with regard to the Ghent system of unemployment benefits, etc.). The absence of a well-functioning Communist fraction in the reformist trade unions makes it impossible to unmask successfully and consistently the treacherous rôle of the trade union leaders, the Social-Democrats, the Catholic Centre, the Nationalist Socialists, and to show broad masses of workers that only the Communists, and not the trade union bureaucrats, really defend and know how to defend the economic interests of the proletariat. If there is no well-functioning Communist fraction, the Party members remain in complete ignorance of the policy of the Party on trade union questions, which prevents the Party members from agitating among the non-Party trade union members and unorganised workers for the Party line on these questions; and finally, does not give Party members the opportunity of noting and correcting the mistakes of the Red trade union organisations, revolutionary Factory Committees, revolutionary shop stewards, etc. Without a Communist fraction inside the Red trade unions, the Party committees not only cannot lead and control their activities, but cannot even maintain constant close contact with the Red trade unions or keep a united front with the workers of all shades of political opinion in order to organise resistance to the attacks of the bourgeoisie, to expose the leading organs of the class-collaboration trade unions, their treachery on the question of wages, rationalisation, working hours, and their stand on the side of capital in connection with "peace in industry," etc.

In order to do all this there must be Party and Red trade union organisations inside the factories; and these, in the majority of cases, do not exist. It is important to begin at once to create organisations of Red trade unions in the factories which will take the form of a union of all members of Red trade unions working in the factory, with the appointment of a leading Bureau which should be in close contact with the local section of the existing Red trade union. The same must be done with members of the Minority Movement and the trade union oppositions in those countries where Red trade unions do not exist. The bureau created must maintain contact not with the local branches of the reformist or other non-Red trade unions, but with the local branches of the Minority Movement or the trade union opposition.

In those countries and industries where neither a Minority Movement nor a trade union opposition exists, Communists belonging to the same union must be united into fractions in the factories and a bureau, closely connected with the leading centre of the Communist fraction of the corresponding union, must be appointed. But it is not enough to have an organisation in

the factory; it must be made to work well. Consequently, the corresponding leading organs of the Red trade unions, the Minority Movement, etc., must lead, instruct and systematically control their work. The Party members in all these organisations must be directed through Communist nuclei in the factories (where there are no nuclei, they must immediately be organised), under the direct supervision of the District and Local Party Committees. Having done this—and it is well within the power of all sections of the Communist International and the R.I.L.U. to do so—we shall be in a position to win in the election of officials in the factories also (election of Factory Committees, shop stewards, factory delegates, workers' representatives for administration of Social Insurance, etc.).

Soviet Trade Union Delegates Must Show the Way.

Delegates from the Soviet trade unions who have had enormous experience in work in the factories, in the building and leadership of trade unions and through them of the broad masses of toilers in the Soviet Union, at this Vth Congress of the R.I.L.U., must show the Congress representatives from capitalist countries how the Bolshevik professional revolutionaries fought against the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries in the Russian trade union movement both before the February Revolution and between the February and October Revolutions; how this struggle was linked up with assiduous, energetic work in the factories and trade unions, and with the no less strenuous ideological struggle not only on trade union questions but on general political questions. This is what all sections of the R.I.L.U. and Communist International need to-day. The Soviet trade unions must in actual practice participate constantly and energetically in the work of the R.I.L.U. It will then be possible for it to pass on to its sections the valuable experience of the Soviet trade unions.

In the resolution of the XVth Congress of the C.P.S.U. on the report of the C.P.S.U. delegation in the E.C.C.I., we read as follows:—

> "The Congress considers it essential that the R.I.L.U. be strengthened in every way. In this connection the Congress considers it necessary to establish closer contact between the R.I.L.U. and the All Union Central Council of Trade Unions."

The late leadership of the A.U.C.C.T.U. not only failed to institute "closer connections" with the R.I.L.U., but the "Commission for Foreign Contracts" of the former, which was headed by a member of the Presidium of the A.U.C.C.T.U., carried on rivalry with the R.I.L.U. in every possible place. At the IVth Congress of the R.I.L.U., which took place a few

months after the XVth Congress of the C.P.S.U., certain delegates from Soviet trade unions—Comrades Yaglom, Ginsburg and others—carried on a campaign among the foreign delegates to the Congress against Comrade Lozovsky and the theses on the first point of the agenda, despite the fact that Comrade Lozovsky had been put forward by the A.U.C.C.T.U. as the Secretary of the R.I.L.U. and that the above thesis has been examined in the presence of members of the Presidium of the A.U.C.C.T.U., and Comrade Tomsky participated in their final editing. By their campaign, these comrades brought confusion into the ranks of the foreign delegations. During the IVth Congress Comrades Ginsburg and Yaglom supported the Right Trade Union officials in the German Communist Party (Walcher, Enderle, Sievers and others, all of whom are now expelled from the Party). This was in spite of the fact that they knew that during the IXth Plenum of the E.C.C.I., a joint meeting had taken place of the Russian and German delegations in the E.C.C.I. (at which Comrade Tomsky was present), where a decision had been taken to remove the Rights from the leadership of the trade union section of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany. This was because they had been obstructing the struggle against the expulsion of Communists from reformist trade unions during the IVth Congress, the Rights and Conciliators were against the tactics of " class against class " in the trade union movement, as instituted at the IXth Plenum of the E.C.C.I.

It then became necessary to call a meeting of the Bureau of the A.U.C.C.T.U. fraction during the Congress, which put an end to the disorganising work of Comrade Yaglom and others. Nevertheless, this support of trade union workers, Rights and Concilliators in the German Communist Party continued further during the VIth Congress of the Communist International, which took place soon after (on the part of Comrades Yaglom, Ginsburg and others). During the proceedings of the VIth Congress, a joint meeting was arranged between the German delegation to the Congress and the A.U.C.C.T.U. delegation in the R.I.L.U. At this meeting Comrade Yaglom made such severe, unfounded criticisms of the policy of the German Communist Party on the trade union question that even some of his own supporters were compelled to dissociate themselves from him.

The attitude of the new leadership of the A.U.C.C.T.U. towards the leading organs of the R.I.L.U. is quite different. At the meetings of the Executive Bureau and the Central Council of the R.I.L.U., members of the Presidium and Secretariat of the A.U.C.C.T.U. actively participate. But even this is insufficient. The Presidium of the A.U.C.C.T.U. must as quickly as possible carry out its own decision, approved by the

XVIth Congress of the C.P.S.U. on the report of Comrade Shvernik on the more active participation of the A.U.C.C.T.U. in the work of the R.I.L.U. The Presidium of the A.U.C.C.T.U. must, therefore, appoint certain of its members for *permanent,* work in the R.I.L.U., since at the present moment, of the members of the Presidium only, Comrade Lozovsky works permanently in the R.I.L.U.

Work of Leading Organs of the R.I.L.U.

In conclusion it is necessary to dwell upon the work of the leading organs of the R.I.L.U. and methods of work of the International Committees of Propaganda and Action.

In all central committees and organisations of the sections of the Communist International, there exist trade union sections for carrying on the work of leadership of Communist fractions in the trade unions. The E.C.C.I. has no such department. Contact between the E.C.C.I. and the R.I.L.U. exists only through the Communist members of the leading organs of the latter. This method does not always guarantee the actual carrying out of the Communist International political line by the R.I.L.U. apparatus. It is therefore essential to ensure the permanent existence of a Communist fraction in the Central Council of the R.I.L.U., and the uninterrupted work of the Bureau of the Communist fraction to be composed of the Communist members of the Executive Bureau of the R.I.L.U. Moreover, leading instructions and directions sent by the International Committees of Propaganda and Action to the corresponding Red trade unions, the sections of trade union oppositions and Minority Movement, and to the trade union departments of the Communist Parties, must first be examined either by the Secretariat of the Executive Bureau of the R.I.L.U. or by its Organisational Department. This must be done in order to ensure united leadership and to avoid discrepancies in the instructions sent out. It would be worth while increasing the practice of live, personal instructions to the sections affiliated to the International Committees of Propaganda and Action by their leading organs, thereby reducing the number of paper instructions.

As for the work of the Executive Bureau of the R.I.L.U. itself, it should also change its method of leadership of its sections. It should give not only tactical and political instructions and consider questions of principle in the trade union movement of one or other of its sections, but should give instructions as to *how* to carry out various decisions, and also *control* their fulfilment.

It is essential at all costs to increase the practice of live, personal instructions in localities where anything like large

campaigns (elections to trade union bodies, elections to Factory Committees, renewal of collective agreements, economic strikes) are likely to take place. Instructors and representatives of the R.I.L.U., sent by its Executive Bureau, have brought considerable assistance to the movement. The Executive Bureau and the Secretariat must more than ever before take up and consider the more practical and organisational questions of the trade union movement, for immediately after the Vth Congress, all efforts must be turned towards carrying out in practice its decisions of making the factories the centre of all revolutionary trade union work, and improving the work of preparing and leading economic strikes.

The Executive Bureau of the R.I.L.U. must create a flexible apparatus of instructors to help its more important sections in their work of seriously studying the economic situation of their country and the most important branches of industry and the labour market. Without such careful study of these questions, the sections will have difficulty in working out in time the workers' demands, preparing for the renewal of collective agreements, for strikes, etc. This form of activity is very weak in many sections.

Struggle Against Opportunist and Sectarian Errors.

Finally, the Executive Bureau must continue with ever greater energy the struggle against Right opportunism in the international revolutionary trade union movement. The Right deviation is, as before, the chief danger in the R.I.L.U., especially when taken in conjunction with the tasks of organising resistance and counter-attacks of the proletariat against the offensive of capital. At the same time, more attention must be paid to the struggle against " left " sectarianism, which leads to passivity among members of the Party towards work inside reformist and other trade unions. This " left " sectarianism was actually discovered in the Central Council and Executive Bureau of the R.I.L.U. itself. It is expressed in the fact that the organised workers in non-Red unions are labelled as the most reactionary section of the proletariat; that the " rank and file organisations of the reformist trade unions " are merely the tools of the strike-breaking policy of their leaders in the factories; that the Social-Fascist trade union bureaucracy utilise for their Fascist purposes the whole trade union apparatus and even its delegates in the factories; that the slogan of " winning the trade unions " must be dropped, since it " includes the conception of seizing the apparatus," and the slogan " winning the membership of the reformist trade unions " should be launched in its place; and that work in the reformist trade unions should be carried on *only* in the factories; and finally, that all

members of Social Democratic parties are " little Zörgiebels " (the Social-Democratic Zörgiebel is the Berlin President of the Police, who shot down the May Demonstration in Berlin in 1929 and numerous other demonstrations of the German proletariat).

Despite the fact that these sectarian proposals have been brought up times without number, and turned down by the R.I.L.U. and the Communist International, and that some of those decisions have been formulated in exact terms allowing of no misinterpretation, these sectarian ideas are seized upon by those comrades who find it difficult to work in the reformist trade unions, as justification for passivity in this work and even as justification for leaving the trade unions. At the same time, almost all the resolutions of the R.I.L.U. and Communist International mention the absolute necessity of increasing the work of the Communist Parties inside the reformist trade unions.

> " In connection with the main task—the task of winning over the masses, whose radicalisation in circumstances of the maturing crisis must proceed at an ever-increasing pace—*work in the Reformist trade unions* is of specially important significance, and also work, on the basis of the tactics of a united front from below, for the liberation of the working masses from the influence of reformist traitors."

The work of Communists in the reformist trade unions during the last year has been weak even in Germany, owing to the fact that a section of the Communists were guilty of opportunism in practice, and actually differed very little from the reformists, also, though to a lesser degree, because of the influence of the " left " sectarianism, for supporters of these ideas (Comrade Merker and others) were to be found in the trade union department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany and also among the leaders of the Central Committee of the All-German Trade Union Opposition.

Certain of the " left " sectarian slogans may at first seem correct; consequently we will examine certain of them.

1. That the masses in the reformist trade unions are not the most reactionary section of the proletariat has now become clear even to the authors of this statement. But among the German Communists working in the trade unions there are still supporters of this idea.

2. The declaration to the effect that the apparatus of the reformist unions—including the lower units in the factories—is entirely Fascist, is of considerable significance for the work of the Communists inside the reformist trade unions. To the same category belongs the slogan of " winning the membership of the reformist unions "—instead of the slogan of " winning the trade unions," the latter including also the conception of

" winning the apparatus." After all, Communists can, without working inside the trade unions, carry on Communist agitation and propaganda among trade union members inside the factories, on the way to work and back, at home, etc. What has this to do with trade unions? Obviously the point raised here is that they must be won *inside* the trade unions. How can this be done? Communists and members of the trade union opposition put up their demands for wage agreements, ways and means of working in the trade unions, etc., in opposition to the activities and demands of the reformists. Trade union members choose between reformists and Communists. How can we consolidate the victory of the Communists if the majority of the trade union membership in a factory or in a local branch of a trade union, come over to our side? By electing supporters of the trade union opposition to positions as shop stewards in the factories, to the committees of local trade union branches, as delegates to trade union conferences, etc.

Is it possible to win in such elections? It is possible and essential. Quite recent information points to the fact that Communists can win over the lower trade union apparatus in factories—shop steward committees and local branches of unions. In Germany, for instance, it is still possible to find many Communists holding such positions in the factories and local committees of trade unions with a Communist majority (in 1930 in Germany there were 301 such branch committees. At the last elections to trade union branch committees the German Communist Party obtained a majority in 34 local committees). At the beginning of 1930 the Königsberg Communists managed to get one of their number elected as secretary to a local trade union in the place of a reformist who had held the position for thirteen years! In many local branches of trade unions in Germany, non-Party workers form the majority, and among shop stewards in the factories, non-party trade union members form not a small percentage. They cannot all be called strikebreakers and fascists! Of course, the reformists fight the Communists—both among the shop stewards and in trade union branches with a Communist majority—even using open violence and closing down the branches in question. But what of it? It is just these acts of violence that help to unmask the reformists and tear away the workers from their influence. The Xth Plenum of the E.C.C.I. examined this very question and gave it an exhaustive formulation :—

> " At the same time it would be a harmful opportunist illusion to imagine that we can in exisiting circumstances capture the reformist trade union apparatus, even having on our side the mass of the trade union membership. But this in no way signifies that Communists and the revolutionary opposition must be passive at the elections to the trade union leadership. On the contrary, the struggle to drive out of the trade unions all bureaucrats and capitalist agents, the fight for every elected post in the trade unions, especially the fight for the shop stewards, should serve as a mighty weapon in our hands for the unmasking of the rôle of the Socialist-Fascist trade union bureaucracy and for the struggle against it." (Resolution on the trade union question, section VI, par. 4.)

3. It would seem at first sight quite correct to say that working in the trade unions means working only in the factories. Are we not always striving to bring the centre of gravity of our Party and trade union work into the factories? Upon closer examination, however, we find that this idea is very harmful. When we fight to transfer the centre of gravity of our Party and trade union work to the factories, nobody declares that we must work *only* in the factories and workshops. The street Party nuclei remain, and must remain. Nobody would think of giving up our agitational work in houses, barracks, streets, etc. We have Communist Parties, trade union oppositions, Minority Movements and Communist fractions in trade unions, which have almost no connection with the factories, but they work frequently most successfully in the trade unions (the Communist Party and Minority Movement in England, Communist Party and Trade Union opposition in Norway, Austria, Holland, South and Central America, even in France). Is it so difficult to work in the local branches of reformist trade unions, or for Communists to speak at trade union delegate meetings, conferences, congresses? All " slogans " of this kind bring grist to the mill of those who either will not or cannot overcome difficulties in connection with work in the reformist trade unions. The same can be said of the statements about " little Zörgiebels."

There are millions of members in the Social-Democratic parties, including a great number of workers. Many of them will leave the Social-Democratic party once they realise the role of the real Zörgiebels. Almost all workers and employees, members of the Social-Democratic parties, are members of trade unions; we must agitate among them and many will be won away from the Social Democrats and reformists. But once we label them Zörgiebels, how can we talk to them or agitate among them?

4. The idea that it is necessary to remove, as out-of-date, the slogan: " Join the reformist trade unions." Of course, in this general form, the slogan is no good, and even harmful. This slogan plays no part in those countries where there are already Red trade unions. For Germany, this slogan is obsolete

and even harmful, for in Germany the trade upion opposition works not only inside the trade unions but also outside of them. The trade union opposition takes in branches of trade unions which have been expelled by the reformists (plumbers, turners, carpenters, miners and others) and Red Factory Committees. Membership of the trade union opposition is open to organised and unorganised workers, employees, etc. Why is it necessary, then, to recruit for the reformists?

The slogan is out-of-date for Poland also. There are no real mass trade unions in Poland. The Polish Socialist Party trade unions have split.

The Polish Socialists (Yavorsky clique) have openly gone over to Pilsudsky's clique together with a section of the trade unions. Almost all the political parties have their trade unions.

For the trade unions of which political parties can the Polish Communist Party do recruiting work?

The trade unions of all tendencies in Poland betray the interests of the workers and employees. The Polish Communist Party therefore was long ago compelled to organise separate trade unions, for the time being on a local scale, which unions are continually suffering severe persecution for defending the interests of the workers. The Polish Communist Party must still more enegetically than before begin to organise its own trade unions. The slogan " join the reformist trade unions " has long become obsolete for Poland and, in fact, has been withdrawn by the Polish Communist Party.

But even in countries like Poland and Germany, where the recruiting of members for reformist trade unions long ago ceased, the open withdrawal of the slogan " join the reformist trade unions " by no means denotes that Communists and supporters of the trade union opposition should or may leave the reformist trade unions or slacken work inside them. On the contrary, they should hold tight to every position they have, enabling them to remain inside the trade unions and unmask the treacherous role of the trade union bureaucracy; and from inside the reformist trade unions they should help the revolutionary trade union opposition to carry on economic struggles. Moreover, the Communist Party of Germany, in our opinion, should send its new members who do not belong to reformist, Catholic or other trade unions, into these unions, in order with their help to strengthen the work of the Communist fractions and the revolutionary opposition.

But these conditions do not exist in all countries. Take for example the Woollen Textile Workers Union in England, where there was recently a strike. Our Party worked quite energetically among the strikers, especially among the unorganised. The Communist Party and the Minority Movement collected funds which they distributed among the unorganised strikers since the trade unions do not give strike pay to unorganised workers. The strike was smashed by the reformists. The organised, and more so the unorganised workers, were highly indignant with the trade union bureaucrats. Why can we not recruit trade union members from among these unorganised woollen workers, in order with their assistance to throw out the acting officials in the local trade union organisations who helped to betray the strike? The Minority Movement has organised its own section of the woollen workers, it has influence among them; this means it can lead the new members. And yet there are any amount of cases of this kind in countries where there are no Red trade unions.

5. The problem of creating new class trade unions is extremely important. It must not therefore be dealt with in general terms, as is done by certain responsible R.I.L.U. workers. They say that if we wish not in words but in deeds to lead the growing economic movement of the masses, if we want to bring the struggle to a victorious end, *we must at once* prepare ourselves and prepare the masses for the creation of class trade unions.

To raise the question in this way is wrong and even harmful. What is meant by at once preparing ourselves and preparing the masses for the creation of class trade unions? Where, in what countries, in which branches of industry? Can, for instance, the British Communist Party at the present moment, with its three thousand members and its amorphous, Minority Movement, begin at once to organise itself and the masses for the creation of class trade unions in all British industries? It is absurd to treat the question in this way. It creates confusion in the minds of Party members. Why remain in the treacherous trade unions of the reformists, why work there and pay membership subscriptions, if we are to begin *at once* to prepare for the creation of new revolutionary unions. It is easier to find members for the creation of new trade unions, than to work inside the reformist trade unions, but whether they will become mass trade unions if they are created at an unsuitable moment and in unsuitable places—this is quite another question.

The Xth Plenum of the E.C.C.I. examined this question also and adopted a decision which is far from obsolete even now. This is the decision :—

" But Communists must understand that splitting trade unions is not a question of mechanical formation of unions. One should fight energetically the idea of generally splitting the trade unions. The formation of new trade unions is only

possible at the high tide of strikes, only where the political struggle is very keen, where considerable sections of the proletariat have already grasped the social-imperialist character of the reformist trade union bureaucracy, and when these masses are actively supporting the formation of a new union. But if all these conditions exist the formation of new trade unions in countries where there are no independent revolutionary unions as yet (e.g., in Germany) can be undertaken only cases by case, in conformity with the whole objective situation."

(Resolution on the trade union question of the Xth Plenum of the E.C.C.I., section VI, paragraph 8.)

Many of the questions, analysed by us here, are not new, although they played a large part in the discussions before the Vth R.I.L.U. Congress, and will obviously be touched upon in the Congress itself. They are raised periodically before Congresses and Plenums of the R.I.L.U. and Communist International. It is difficult to object to this. The worst of it is, of course, that the " left " sectarians in the Communist International and R.I.L.U. sections seize upon these rejected slogans, proposals and instructions and cease, or slacken, their work *in the Reformist Trade Unions*. By so doing they not only leave many millions of members of reformist trade unions in the grip of the trade union bureaucracy but make it possible for Right elements inside the Communist Parties and opportunists in practice to carry on their disintegrating work in the trade unions without hindrance, thereby discrediting the Communist Party in the eyes of the reformist trade union membership.

The decision of the IVth Congress of the R.I.L.U. concerning the independent leadership of economic struggles was of considerable ideological and practical importance for both Communists and revolutionary workers. The Vth Congress, which is meeting at the very height of the world economic crisis, enormous unemployment and the upward drive of the world Labour movement, must give a Bolshevik analysis of what is going on, and indicate the road to follow and methods to be used for the careful preparation, leadership and final victory of the coming economic struggles, at the same time preventing the reformists from betraying the workers, and raising economic strikes to the higher level of political struggle and thus freeing the working masses, still following the reformists, from their influence.

The general slogan of the Vth Congress of the R.I.L.U. must be to win the working masses at all costs. But to win the majority of the working class it is essential that the practical trade union work of the Communists and worker supporters of the R.I.L.U. be on a level with the correct Bolshevik policy.

II.—ALL SECTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL AND THE RED INTERNATIONAL OF LABOUR UNIONS MUST BECOME REALLY MASS ORGANISATIONS.

What are the main reasons for the *weak growth* (C.P. of Germany, C.P. of U.S.A., C.P. of Austria) and in certain sections of the C.I. (C.P. of France, C.P. of Czechoslovakia, C.P. of Great Britain) even *the loss of membership?*

This question is being debated in the Comintern and its sections. Many comrades, while agreeing that the causes of weak growth and even of loss of membership by the C.I. sections in the capitalist countries are the bad work of the sections and their incapacity *to reinforce organisationally their growing political influence,* demand proofs that these are the *main* reasons and that there are not other still more weighty causes, which, however, they are unable even to name.

We will endeavour to prove on the basis of facts, that *it depends only upon the Comintern sections themselves to increase the membership, to retain the new members made, and thereby to reinforce their political influence organisationally.*

Sections of the C.I. Can Win the Masses.

When the C.I. sections organise campaigns that can be understood by the masses, at the same time mobilising all Party organisations to carry them out, they will encounter the resolute support of wide sections of the masses. Look at the facts:

(*a*) The *C.P. of China* has had and still has to work in the industrial centres under the unprecedented terror of the Kuomintang and the Imperialists, and despite this, there has not been a single case where the masses have not followed the Party when it has organised anti-Kuomintang or anti-Imperialist demonstrations that have been well-prepared. On May 30th, 1929, the anniversary of the 1925 shootings, the C.P. of China organised strikes and demonstrations in Shanghai. The Kuomintang and Imperialist authorities mobilised all their forces to prevent the Communist Party carrying through this campaign; the entire police force was standing ready; demonstrations and strikes were forbidden under pain of death. Under cover of a semi-legal committee of repre-

sentatives of social organisations, organised in connection with the murder of a Chinaman by a British soldier, the Communist Party convened a conference of the delegates of 60 Trade Unions, students and Communist organisations which prepared the May 30 strikes and demonstrations. The working masses rallied. Mass demonstrations in which scores of thousands took part were held in the main streets of Shanghai. The domonstrations lasted several hours, and two Kuomintang newspaper offices were smashed up. The dockers, many textile mills, the postal workers and students struck work. The Kuomintang Postal Workers' Union and the universities, whose students struck on May 30th, were dissolved and closed down by the Kuomintang. This action, prepared energetically and competently, in Bolshevik fashion, by the C.P. in Shanghai, after a long absence of open activity, immediately raised the authority of both the Communist Party and the Red Trade Unions throughout the whole of China. New members joined both the Party and the Red Unions. (Up till then, the latter had an even smaller membership than the Party organisations.) The May, 1929, demonstrations in Shanghai were thus to a certain extent a turning point in the extension of the activities of the C.P. and the Red Trade Unions in all spheres of Party and Trade Union work in China.

(*b*) On the eve of May 1st, 1930, the Calcutta Committee of the C.P. of India got out several leaflets, appealing to the workers in the Party's name. It called upon the workers to strike on May 1st. A handful of Party members carried on energetic activity among the workers of the factories and mills. As a result the workers of the biggest factories in Calcutta came out on May 1st.

(*c*) The C.P. of Poland has to work under the very difficult conditions of Fascist Terror. Working in the Secret Police are members of the P.P.S. (Polish Socialist Party) who, knowing the active workers of the C.P. of Poland in person, betray them to the police. The Polish prisons are filled to overflowing with members of the C.P. of Poland. In spite of this, during big campaigns, such as the elections of factory delegates, sick-fund committees, municipal councils or Seym deputies, or campaigns for strikes and demonstrations, if the Party organisations are very active, the workers not only vote for the C.P.P. candidates, but take part in the demonstrations. And they do that despite the fact that nearly all demonstrations end by demonstrators being arrested, beaten up or shot by the P.P.S-ites or the police.

At the big "Parovoz" works in Warsaw, where the C.P.P. had strong influence, Party work at one time for various reasons became very feeble and the P.P.S-ites succeeded every-

where in squeezing out the Communists and their sympathisers. The Warsaw organisation of the C.P.P. gave attention to the "Parovoz" works, strengthening the Party activities there. As a result, the Socialists were very soon swept out of all their positions and our Party not only won back its old positions, but strengthened its influence.

Facts concerning the activities of the legal Communist Parties testify to the same thing. We need only refer to a few examples.

(*d*) The small C.P. of the U.S.A. (after the expulsion of the Rights it had 8,000 members), freed from the opportunist leadership of the Lovestonites, carried on widespread and energetic activity in all spheres of Party work. The Communists, along with the members of the Trade Union Unity League, organised new class Trade Unions, prepared and led strikes of miners, dockers, textile workers, etc. At the call of the C.P. of America and the T.U. Unity League, following the preparatory work undertaken by the latter, 1,250,000 workers in all industrial towns of the U.S.A. came out on to the streets on March 6th, on the International Day of Struggle against unemployment. In the process of organising class trade unions, leading strikes and preparing demonstrations, the C.P of America has had some success in recruiting new members. According to information not yet verified by the E.C.C.I. the Party increased its membership by 100 per cent. during these campaigns.

(*e*) In Czecho-Slovakia, at the very height of the inner-Party crisis, when the Rights openly revolted against the Party, mobilising their supporters in the Trade Unions, co-operatives, Parliament, Senate, municipalities, newspapers, etc., the C.P. developing an extensive electoral campaign in 1929, directed against all bourgeois and social-democratic Parties as well as against the Right renegades, received 750,000 workers' votes. Some semi-social-democrats and passive elements left the Party, but in exchange a large number of revolutionary workers flocked to the Party and helped the C.P.Cz. to operate the policy of "class against class."

(*f*) In all campaigns conducted by the C.P. of France, active assistance is rendered by hundreds of thousands of non-Party sympathisers. Last year, when the French bourgeoisie tried to lay their hands on *l'Humanité*, believing that the C.P.F. would not be able to pay at once all the debts to the Workers' and Peasants' Banks, workers collected several million francs in support of the paper within two to three months. Thousands of non-Party workers organised "*l'Humanité* Defence Committees," chiefly in the factories. The bourgeoisie retreated.

It had not expected such an outburst of indignation amongst the workers throughout the whole of France.

The Red Trade Unions in France, which are under the influence of the C.P., have prepared and led several thousand strikes during the last two years. When the unorganised workers become convinced that the Red Trade Unions are really leading the class struggle, they will willingly join these trade unions. In Belfort, where 13,000 metal-workers and textile-workers were on strike, 2,400 new members joined the Metal-workers' and Textile-workers' Unions after the end of the strike. In Gise, after a strike in which 1,100 metal-workers had participated, 90 per cent. of the strikers—about 1,000 workers—joined the Metal-workers' Union.

(*g*) The C.P. of Great Britain, during the General Strike and Miners' Strike, carried on energetic work and therefore succeeded in recruiting more than 6,000 members for the Party (increasing the membership by more than 100 per cent.). In many mining districts the Party organisations during the strike could not keep pace with all the applications for membership. After the defeat of the strike, the number desiring to join the Party decreased. During the recent woollen strike and lockout, in which the C.P. of Great Britain, creating Committees of Action and Strike Committees, energetically fought the employers and the reformist trade union bureaucrats, many men and women strikers joined the Party.

(*h*) The C.P. of Germany at the 1928 Parliamentary elections received 3,230,000 working class votes, while the paying membership of the Party was 130,000. This gives on an average 25 votes for a Communist candidate, for every one Party member. It is to be hoped that at the coming elections in September of this year, the Party will receive about 4,000,000 votes.

In 1929, the C.P. of Germany for the first time began to apply the tactics of independent leadership in the economic struggles, defeating the strike-breaking efforts of the trade union bureaucrats and putting forward its own independent candidates at the Factory Committee Elections (up to 1929 at the Factory Committee Elections the Communists fought inside the trade unions to get their own candidatures included in the lists put forward by the trade unions). In 1929, the C.P.G. put forward its own independent candidate lists in more than 120 average-sized and large enterprises, and received in these places almost as many votes as were received by the Social-Democrats, viz.: In 104 factories the reformists received 121,236 and the trade union opposition 116,730; in the same factories in 1930, the reformists received 106,902 votes (14,334 less than in 1929) and the Communists received 110,028 (6,702 less than in 1929).

In 1930 the C.P. of Germany already put forward its own lists in more than 1,200 average-size and large undertakings employing a total of two-and-a-half million working men and women; at the same time in 700 of these factories the Party received more votes than the Social-Democrats, and in many of these 700 received an absolute majority over the votes given for all lists. The number of votes won by the Red lists from the Social-Democrats and reformists in one group of fifteen factories alone—in the Ruhr, Rhine and Upper Silesian areas, amounts to 12,667. (In 1929 the reformists received 23,390 votes in these factories, while in 1930, when the C.P.G. put forward its own lists, they received 13,403.) The C.P. of Germany altogether had 7,000 members of factory committees and 4,000 candidates.

There was not a single revolutionary campaign (parliamentary and municipal elections, demonstrations, factory committee elections, calls for strikes, etc.), that was not able to rally large numbers of the masses, once the Communist Party had made preparations in good time and sufficiently skilfully arranged for the participation of all the auxiliary organisations. All the revolutionary campaigns, particularly the strikes led by the Communist Party (beginning with the Ruhr strike struggle at the end of 1928 right up to and including the Mansfield strike) have been accompanied by the recruitment of new members to the Party and Trade Union Opposition.

As is known, the workers of the whole world warmly responded to the call of the C.I. to demonstrate on the International Day of Struggle Against War (August 1st, 1929 and 1930) and on the Day of Struggle Against Unemployment (March 6th, 1930). What is more: it is characteristic that the "class against class" tactics, as expressed in the Communist Parties coming out against all bourgeois Parties, including the "Socialists," was supported energetically by the workers of Germany, France and other countries, whereas the operation of such tactics met with resistance on the part of some of the leading members of the C.P.s of Germany, France, Great Britain, America and other countries. It would be possible to cite many other facts from the life of all sections of the C.I., confirming the assertion that when the Communist Parties prepare and lead revolutionary campaigns, the working masses actively support them and the best elements of the working class make endeavours to join the only working class Parties—the Communist Parties.

WHY DO WE LOSE RECRUITS?

Unfortunately, it must be admitted that the C.I. Sections often not only fail to retain new members, but also lose old ones. Why? We will try and explain the reasons for this.

(1) The Party organisations in all sections of the C.I. in capitalist countries develop their activities from one campaign to another, instead of carrying on steady systematic work among the masses.

(2) The Party organisations do not pay sufficient attention to the training of new Party members. In the majority of cases they are not drawn into Party work, because the cell bureaus, the secretariat and bureaus of district committees and of other local Party organisations seldom function as permanent Party organs and general meetings of the cells and local Party organisations meet very seldom and when they do they are as a rule badly prepared. Even plenums of Party Committees are a very rare occurrence. All these meetings are substituted by meetings of the local and district active functionaries, which, moreover, are summoned insufficiently frequently and which, in fact, replace both the meetings and conferences of district and local organisations. As a result, such an important institution in Party structure as the meeting of the active functionaries, instead of bringing questions already discussed before the cells, meetings of district or sub-district Party organisations, for further elaboration, and thus livening them up, making them permanently functioning organs—actually replace them.

(3) But so long as the Party Committees and the general meetings of cells and local Party organisations do not function, it is quite easy to understand why the factory cells have not yet become the basic Party organisation in the factories and works. There are many factories and works where there are Party members, who do not form factory cells. Moreover, not all Communists are members of the factory cell already existing in the factory where they work, but belong to the residential Party groups. This even continues at the present time, in spite of the fact that the Social-Democrats, for whom the residential basis is the main form of Party organisation, as also the National-Fascists, are beginning not by words, but by deed, to transfer their operations to the factories, in order to combat the Communists. (They are organising their factory cells and publishing factory newspapers.)

(4) In the absence of permanent activity by the cell bureaus, the secretariats and the bureaus of Party Committees, in the absence of collective guidance and control of the work by the local and district Party organisations, it is inevitable that insufficient attention is paid to the work of the existing factory and street cells. It also means insufficient attention to factory newspapers and to the local Party press in general, as also to the work of the Red Factory Committees, the revolutionary and trade union delegates. Furthermore, the Communist fractions in the factory committees, and in the reformist and

Red Trade Unions, and in general all Communist fractions in mass workers' organisations are left without Party guidance. If we add to that the absence of proper self-criticism, it becomes clear why red tape and very often bureaucratic practices develop in local and district Party organisations.

(5) It is only by such abnormalities in the work of the local Party organisations that we can explain the cases, to be observed everywhere in all sections of the C.I., where Party Committees find out about economic conflicts in the factories, when they are already ended, as in the majority of cases the Communists working in these factories either pay no attention at all to what is going on in the factories, or else act on the off-chance without the guidance of the various Party organisations, which often leads to various forms of opportunism in practice.

We will illustrate this by facts cited from the practice of our sections. On January 26th, 1930, the Marx cell of a provincial organisation of the C.P. of Poland passed a resolution in which it states :—

" We, members of the C.P.P., lodge a complaint about the dilatoriness of our leaders, who have forgotten about our cell for several months now and it has not been assisted by anyone. We categorically demand some sort of guidance for a definite period, otherwise we will have to abandon our fighting position, which we have been using up till now to fight for a Workers' and Peasants' Government.

" We demand that this resolution be sent to the C.C. . . "

" At the time of the ' three L's ' campaign (Lenin-Liebknecht-Luxemburg) our cell was assisted by a member of the District Committee, Comrade X., who instructed us to hang up our banners during the ' three L's ' campaign and to write up slogans on the houses, which we did.

" . . . However, when we asked Comrade X. to teach us what to do, and to speak to us on the subject, he said he would willingly help us, but he had nothing new for us, as the District Committee had not met for more than three months. Therefore, we ask, already for the second time, that greater attention be paid to our training, so that we can really represent our Party. . . ."

" . . . You should teach us how to become experienced and to adapt ourselves to the struggle. We are already quite well aware how to hang up flags on telephone wires and how to chalk slogans on walls. But we not only do not know how to beat our opponents at meetings and conferences, as we do not know what their Parties stand for, but we do not even know the aims of our own Party. . . ."

" . . . We demand that we be given systematic guidance and not as before once a month or once every three months."

The resolution cited above, unfortunately, is not a peculiarity of the provincial organisation of the Polish C.P. referred to. The same inattention to party cells, the same absence of guidance of the lower Party organisations, particularly the factory cells, on the part of the higher Party Committees is a frequent occurrence in both the legal and illegal Communist Parties in all capitalist countries.

Many Party organisations of the *C.P. of France* learnt only from the Party newspapers how many groups of workers, from what factories and towns in France had contributed to the *l'Humanité* fund, and in which factories the workers had formed *l'Humanité* Defence Committees.

Furthermore, many Party organisations of the C.P. of France saw in the *l'Humanité* Defence Committees the danger of the formation of a Labour Party which the renegrade groups (the " Workers'-and-Peasants' Party "-ites, excluded from the C.P. the Trotskyists, etc.), could utilise against the C.P.F. instead of taking into their hands such a remarkably broad mass movement, organising it, and directing it along correct channels; instead of, on the basis of this movement, getting into contact with the factories (where the C.P.F. has very poor contacts) turning these committees into permanent organs informing *l'Humanité* what is going on in the factories, increasing our circulation through them, and, finally, drawing the best elements of these committees into the Party and the Red Trade Unions— instead of doing all this, many local Party organisations did not pay sufficient attention to the *l'Humanité* Defence Committees, despite the fact that instructions were issued about this in good time. As a result, these committees began to disappear just as spontaneously as they sprang up. And *l'Humanité,* instead of extending its circulation after such a mass response among the working class, lost many readers as compared with those it had before the campaign. Not only the circulation of *l'Humanité* was diminished, but the membership of the Party also decreased as a result of such a passive and inept approach to the mass movement.

The central organ of the C.P. of France, *l'Humanité,* is once more experiencing financial difficulties. We are convinced that the workers of France will rally to the appeal of the C.C. of the C.P. of France and *l'Humanité* to support the paper. Permanent committees for assisting, defending and informing *l'Humanité* should be formed in the factories, and the local Party organisations and Red Trade Unions should be instructed as regards the formation and direction of such committees.

In the Lower Reichenau and Blaistadt, in the Teplicsk district of Czechoslovakia, the owners of two glass factories employing 2,400 workers, informed the factory committees that they would have to dismiss a section of the workers temporarily as they wanted to repair the glass baths. One of the factory committees in Lower Reichenau agreed to the dismissal of the workers, who were not members of the Red Trade Unions (in these two factories 1,600 members of the Red Glassworkers' Union were at work). Without preparing a strike, the local leaders of the Red Glassworkers' Union commenced negotiations with the bosses for the liquidation of the conflict, thus sowing confusion among the workers. When it transpired that the bosses would not make any concessions, the Red Glassworkers' Union declared a strike, without having made any preparations, and, without asking the strikers, the strike-leaders gave orders for the furnaces to be extinguished, which played into the hands of the owners, who were interested in the works being temporarily brought to a standstill. The strike lasted six weeks and was lost.

As a result of this strike all the members in these two factories left the Red Glassworkers' Trade Union; 700 of them went over to the Fascists and 120 joined the Catholic Trade Unions.

The German Social-Democrats and the reformist trade unions have betrayed the interests of the working class during the 1914-1919 war and also since the war right up till now. They shot the revolutionary workers in 1919-1921 on a larger scale than in 1929. But then, while taking vengeance against the vanguard of the working class and its Party (the murder of Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxembourg, Tyschko and other Communists and revolutionary workers) the Social-Democrats and reformists maintained their influence over a considerable section of the workers, hypocritically posing as the defenders of their every-day interests, passing, under pressure from the masses, of course, and with the object of retaining influence over them, the law on the eight-hour day, on factory committees, on improved social insurance, and in the first years following the war the trade unions sometimes even declared strikes (the general railway strike at the beginning of 1922, etc.). During the last two years, however, the Social-Democrats have exposed themselves as the *open* betrayers of the working masses, as the direct agents of the bourgeoisie also in the sphere of the attacks on the standard of living of the workers. While in power, the Social-Democrats, and hence, also the reformist trade union bureaucrats, openly worsened all the social insurance laws, particularly the law on unemployment insurance. In 1930 they exempted the bourgeoisie from payment of taxes on milliards of

money, at the same time assessing the broad masses of toilers with millions in the form of indirect and direct taxes, and the introduction of high duties on food products. The Social-Democrats and the reformist trade unions assisted the bourgeoisie in carrying out rationalisation at the cost of the working class, in increasing not only the intensity of labour, but also in lengthening the working day, in lowering not only real but also nominal wages. The Social-Democrats closed down revolutionary mass organisations and shot down unarmed demonstrations of workers and unemployed. To expose the leaders of the reformist trade unions and social-democrats in 1929-1930 was, therefore, much easier than in 1919-21, for, during recent years, their treacherous and counter-revolutionary policy has become more and more frank, more and more clear to the broad masses of workers.

All the more unexpected, then, were the results of the election of the factory committees in 1930 in a large number of big enterprises in Germany. In twenty large undertakings, employing about 200,000 workers, in fifteen of which there were formerly Red factory committees, the C.P. of Germany lost 22,379 votes (38,743 in 1930 as against 61,122 in 1929), while the reformists gained 1,990 votes (52,944 in 1930 as against 50,954 in 1929).

In the nine Berlin undertakings included in this group, eight of which formerly had Red factory committees, the C.P. lost 11,599 votes (18,467 in 1930, as against 30,066 in 1929), while the reformists gained 2,719 votes (24,762 in 1930 as against 22,043 in 1929).

Errors of the Red T.G. Opposition and Communists.

An examination of the reasons for the loss of votes by our Party and the gain of votes by the reformists and Social-Democrats in these twenty large undertakings will enable us to determine the cause why the C.P.G. does not increase its membership and does not check the fluctuation in membership. What are these reasons?

(1) At the Opel Works, in which 7,000 workers are employed, a strike broke out at the beginning of 1930 which created a great deal of noise in the German and Soviet press. The Workers' Factory Committee at the works was in the hands of Communists (in Germany the workers and the employers have separate factory committees, the works committees of the employees and of the workers forming a general factory committee). The workers of the Opel Works were very discontented with the wage rates and with the sweated conditions of labour (Americans had become proprietors of the works, and the American method of intensified labour was introduced, while

the low German wages were retained). The management sacked 200 workers, afterwards recruiting 50 new workers. Upon the protest of the workers' committee against the dismissal of these workers and the taking on of new ones, the management dismissed the chairman of the workers' factory committee. The workers in some shops, incensed by this provocation of the management, downed tools and came out into the factory yard. A meeting was started which continued a long while and the workers of other shops also gradually began to join in the meeting. No guidance whatsoever by the cell nor by the workers' factory committee was felt. The speakers said a great deal, and in general quite correct things about the Young Plan, the internal and international situation of Germany, etc., but did not provide any answer to the question which urgently confronted the workers of the factory: What practical steps should be taken now, this very moment? Instead of taking the leadership into their hands, instead of providing slogans of action to the masses awaiting such leadership, the workers' factory committee went off to negotiate with the management of the works. Is it surprising, after that, that the management succeeded in bamboozling the workers, dragging out the negotiations, under various pretexts, until such time as permission was received from the Franco-British Occupation Commission to occupy the works with German gendarmes (the locality in which the Opel Works are situated was then still occupied by the Allied troops)? The meeting continued to go on after the arrival of the gendarmes, who, after surrounding it, began to seize various active workers out of the crowd. The workers were in a fighting mood, but there was an absence of leadership and of slogans comprehensible to the masses. One worker suggested pushing the gendarmes outside the gates and his proposal was taken up by the whole mass of workers, who immediately began to use pressure and pushed out the gendarmes who had wormed their way in among the workers around the meeting, and among those emerging from the shops. After the appearance of the gendarmes, the works management broke off negotiations with the factory committee, but the latter, instead of steering the workers' indignation in a correct direction, and indicating how they should act, began to persuade the workers " not to allow themselves to be provoked." The majority of the workers went home to dinner without receiving any indication as to what they were to do. They came to work the next day. When the factory committee began to appeal for a strike, the workers stated that they could not count on there being a leadership for this strike. One-and-a-half months after this " strike " the elections to the factory committee in the Opel Works took place, giving the C.P.G. a decrease of 1,804 votes, while the social-democrats and reformists gained 419 votes as compared with 1929.

(2) In the Berlin Transport Society (trams, 'buses, etc.), in which 24,922 workers and employees are employed, the C.P. received an absolute majority of votes in the factory committee elections of 1929 (10,747 votes, as against the 5,934 of the social-democrate and reformists). The Social Democratic management began dismissing the revolutionary workers and taking on their own supporters in their place. In doing this they did not encounter any real protest on the part of the factory committee. It was as a result of this that at the elections to the factory committee in 1930 the reformists received 10,147 votes, while the C.P.G. lost 4,430 votes.

(3) The C.P.G. lost many votes in the twenty factories enumerated above, for exactly the same reasons. The Red factory committees in these works did not carry out a correct Party line; their activity represented a striking example of the Right deviation in practice: they not only failed to organise a struggle against dismissals, wage cuts and longer hours, but, in certain cases, even gave their assent to dismissals of workers. As a matter of fact the Red factory committees in these enterprises did not differ very greatly, in their work, from the reformist factory committees. The reformists, in taking part in the dismissals of workers, tried to get the unorganised workers sacked along with the revolutionaries, as these were the least desirable from the point of view of the trade union bureaucrats. The Red factory committees agreed to the dismissal of those with small families only instead of organising the masses for a systematic and resolute struggle against dismissals of the workers in general. In particular, in agreeing to the dismissal of organised workers, but objecting to the dismissal of the unorganised, the Red factory committees drove the organised workers into the arms of the reformist trade union bureaucrats.

In one very substantial respect the practical work of the Red factory committees did differ from the Reformist factory committees and trade union bureaucrats in many of these twenty enterprises. The reformist factory committees and functionaries conducted a savage campaign against the Communists; the Red factory committees, cells and individual Communists, on the other hand, did not carry on a systematic, resolute, and intransigeant campaign against the reformists and Social-Democrats, although the Communists had an abundance of popuar literature, exposing the Social-Democrat traitors, while the latter only had falsehood and slander to use against the C.P.G. The errors of the Communists, their passivity and bad work in the factories—opportunism in practice—were utilised by the reformists and Social-Democrats, who, however, in order to draw the workers over to their own side, carried on detailed routine work visible and comprehensible to the masses. But these errors of the

Communists were not only exploited by the Social-Democrats; they were also made use of by the open fascists of all shades, who had, of course, the full support of the Social-Democrats, in the fight against the revolutionary workers. At many factories and works where the C.P.G. lost votes at the factory committee elections, the fascists gained. The latter, with the aid of the terrorism of the Government and the employers, are beginning to get an ever stronger hold on the factories, issuing factory papers and forming their own cells, through which, by means of vile demagogy and slanders against our Party, they lead astray the non-class-conscious workers.

We do not doubt that in the coming Reichstag elections campaign the C.P.G. will carry on a vigorous campaign against the Social-Democrats and National-Socialists (fascists), but that is not enough. It is necessary that the Communists and the revolutionary workers, under the leadership of the C.P.G., carry on a continuous, energetic and many-sided fight in all working-class organisations, particularly in the factories and in the unemployed organisations, not only against the Social-Democrats, but also against the fascists.

The German Experience.

The question is being debated in Party circles as to what was the nature of the errors committed by the revolutionary T.U. opposition and the Party cells, which led to the loss of votes in a number of big undertakings in Germany during the recent factory committee elections—were they political or organisational errors? There must, of course, be a proper study of the causes of the errors made in order to rectify them and avoid them in the future. But it seems to us that the very way the question is presented is incorrect. Policy is inseparable from organisation and vice versa. Certainly, in the factories mentioned above the Red factory committees, the cells and individual Communists have not carried out the correct Party policy (it is very significant that the C.P.G. achieved the greatest successes in those factories where the Red factory committees, the cells and individual Communists carried out uncompromisingly the Party tactics of class against class); thus the errors committed are of a political nature. Would these errors of the Red factory committees in the large factories have helped to bring such losses of votes to the Communist Party, and consequently a weakening of the C.P.s position in these factories if the Party cells had done good organisational work, if they had guided the Communists in the Red factory committees, and the Communist T.U. and revolutionary delegates in these factories? There are factories where Red factory committees already exist, but where the Communists are not yet organised into Communist cells. For factories of that category this question

should be formulated: could such errors have been committed by the factory committees if properly functioning cells had existed? Of course not! For the cells would either have compelled the Party members belonging to the Red factory committees to correct their line and carry out the Party tactics or else they would have informed the workers that the Communists in the factory committees were conducting not the Party but reformist tactics, and the authority of the C.P.G. would then by no means have suffered in the eyes of the workers, despite the gross errors of individual Communists. The errors of the Red factory committees were not committed on the last day before the elections, but many months earlier. Why were they not rectified in time, or else why did not the cells or the local Party organisations dissociate themselves from them? Here the fault mainly lies in the bad organisational system, the organisational form of the Party organisations and sections of the C.I. Up to now the Communists working in the factories are not everywhere organised in cells, and not even all the Communists in factories where cells exist, are members of these cells. As a rule the cells in the factories carry on their work among the working men and women badly, they do not distribute the work among their members and in the majority of cases do not organise into fractions the Communists in the factory committees or in the revolutionary delegates' organisation—and as a result of this they either have no control over them at all, or else control them badly. Could the factory cells work so badly if the district committees or Party committees with which they are connected (or should be connected) paid more attention to them, instructed them, controlled their work, in other words led the work properly? Of course not. It is clear, therefore, that the organisational system that has continued to be in practice is useless. It must be changed. Certainly, to carry on Communist work among the masses in the factories, in the face of growing rationalisation, decreased production and mass dismissals, in face of a savage police espionage system in which the Social-Democratic bureaucrats take part, in face of steadily growing unemployment—is very hard. This is particularly so where the old Social-Democratic traditions are preserved, where the Party organisation is on the residential basis and not according to the place of work of the Party member. Proofs exist, however, that these difficulties can be totally overcome. Indeed, there are cells even in the biggest factories and works, which work very well and which consequently carry the majority of the workers with them. Indeed, the C.P.G. was able to mobilise at the last factory committee elections an army of 12,000 Communists and revolutionary workers and employees, working in more than 1,200 big and average-sized factories to put them up as candidates

for the factory committees (of these 12,000 candidates only 300 deserted, 7,000 being elected as members of the factory committees and 4,000 as substitutes). If the work is organised competently the factory management and spies need not know all the members of the factory cell, but the candidates put forward for the factory committees on behalf of the C.P.G. or the trade union opposition are bound to be known to the entire counter-revolutionary band, for their names are displayed openly. Our candidates thus risk losing their jobs at a time when unemployment is rampant, risk being expelled from the trade unions, etc.; nevertheless, the C.P.G. was able to participate in a most important campaign, putting forward its lists in more than 1,200 factories. Does this not prove that with resolute desire, with adequate skill and with correct leadership, the existing difficulties can be overcome? Of course no struggle, least of all the class struggle, can avoid sacrifices. But the workers of the whole world, particularly the Communists, have proved more than once that they are not afraid of sacrifices. Until such time as the Communist Party transfer the centre of gravity of all their Party and T.U. work right into the factories, they will not be able to liberate quite large sections of workers from the influence of the reformist trade union bureaucrats and the Social-Democratic Party, and here and there from the influence of the National-Fascists; in other words, they will not be able to win the majority of the working class.

The Social-Democratic Party of Germany up till now has been organised on the residential basis. Only during the last few years, in order to fight the Communists, has it begun to form cells in factories and to organise factory newspapers. But in spite of this, and even with the residential basis, the S.D. Party has strong connections with the factories through the "free" Amsterdam trade unions, the leaders of which are social-democrats. The reformist "free" trade unions have their delegate-representatives in all factories. These delegates are elected in the factories and work by the members of the trade unions. The trade unions put forward their own panels. At the elections of the factory committees, the reformist trade unions, in putting forward their own panels, appeal for the support of their own members among the workers and employees, who number a total of nearly six millions. If the figures published by *Vorwärts* are correct, the S.D. Party had 1,032,119 members on March 31st, 1930. Even if we reckon that of this number only 300,000 members of the S.D. Party work in factories, the reformists still have an adequate number of candidates for the elections of the factory committee and T.U. delegate-representatives. The Social-Democratic and reformist trade union press, the T.U. apparatus, the apparatus

of the insurance funds—all composed of members of the S.D. Party, the factory committees and T.U. delegates, also comprising mainly members of the S.D. Party, confuse and deceive large numbers of workers in the factories, at trade union meetings. Here they do not immediately encounter the necessary, systematic and organised retaliation of the Communists, as there are either no Party cells at all in the factories, or else they are badly working. The position is no better in regard to the work of the Communist fractions and the trade union opposition inside the reformist trade unions.

The Social-Democratic Party efficiently and skilfully manœuvres both at the centre and in the localities. While at the head of the German Coalition Government it prepared all the financial legislation which shifted on to the shoulders of the masses all the unbearable weight of the Young Plan, the responsibility for the acceptance of which lies entirely with the social-fascists. Even after the bourgeois parties become strong enough to get on without the participation of the Social-Democrats in the Government, the Social-Democrats actually continued to collaborate with the Government in the offensive against the workers' living conditions. Both in their speeches and in Parliament they opposed the Governmuent, but in practice they kept away from the Reichstag a certain number of S.D. deputies to make sure that although having verbally opposed it the law would not fail to get passed at the time of voting. Now, when the S.D. Party realises that the workers are beginning to understand these treacherous games (in the elections to the Saxon Landtag the S.D. Party recently lost 51,000 votes) and when the Brüning Government will not make any concessions to the Party, it has tried another trick. The Social-Democrats tabled a motion in the Reichstag for the abrogation of all the financial legislation that had been introduced on the basis of paragraph 48 of the Constitution by the President of the German Republic. By this gesture they assured for themselves a platform for deceiving the workers at the forthcoming elections when they would say: You see how we, the Social-Democrats, defended the interests of the masses. The active Social-Democrats in the factories act in exactly the same way. As soon as they see that the workers, despite their resistance and sabotage, are beginning to fight, the Social-Democrats immediately try to get hold of the leadership of the movement, drawing up corresponding demands, while at the same time their colleagues in the central and region trade union headquarters either openly betray the strike or else quash it by an arbitration decision, the arbitrators, in most cases, also being social-democrats. Such hard-baked politicians, who, unfortunately, still retain influence over large numbers of the workers can only be fought successfully by flexible, well-functioning Communist fractions in the trade unions and Party cells in the factories, strongly connected, permanently guided and controlled by the district committees and Party committees.

CUT OUT " SPHERES OF INFLUENCE."

The Party organisations of the C.I. sections should at all costs put an end to Social-Democratic traditions in the sphere of " dividing the spheres of influence " between the Party and the trade unions. According to them the Party is engaged in the political struggle and the trade unions in the economic struggle. The Social-Democrats and reformists can indulge in such a system because the S.D. politicians and the reformist T.U. bureaucrats are so remarkably unanimous in the sphere of betraying working class interests and are assured the full support both of the State apparatus and of the whole administrative apparatus of the factories and works. It is quite a different matter with the Communist Party. Just as it is harmful to separate politics from organisation and vice versa, one cannot divide the sphere of influence between Party organisations and the trade union opposition or the Communist fractions in trade unions. The Bolshevik Party organisations can only successfully win the majority of the working class and become its leaders, when every Party member, no matter where he works or to what workers' organisation he belongs, carries out the policy and decisions of the Party, according to the plans drawn up by the Party organisations. For this it is essential that all fundamental questions, including the trade union question (the conducting of strikes, drawing up of demands, conclusion of wage agreements, etc.) be discussed by Party organisations, so that all Party members, no matter where they are working are able to carry on work on the basis of these decisions, making them concrete, in accordance with the conditions in which they have to work. For the better putting into effect of Party decisions, and successful work, Party organisations, above all factory cells, should distribute the work among all Party members in such a way that all Party members who are in unions, on trade union committees, on factory committees, who are T.U. delegates, get together into Communist fractions which should work under the guidance and control of the corresponding Party organisations (fractions of factory committees, fractions in the institution of T.U. or revolutionary delegates in the factories, factory cells, etc.).

That work can only be carried on successfully in that manner is proved by an analysis of the last factory elections and the collective-agreement campaign in Germany. Many Party organisations of the C.P.G. were over-confident in the ability of the trade union opposition to prepare for the con-

clusion of new collective agreements in the most important industries (engineering, textiles, etc.), as also the ability to lead the work in the Red factory committees, and what is more, left the T.U. opposition without adequate control on the part of the Party organisations. What kind of election results were obtained in a number of big factories and how the Red factory committees worked, we have already shown above. The trade union opposition prepared for the conclusion of the new collective agreements very late in the day, and in a very inefficient manner. This German experience—and not only the German—clearly demonstrates the need to put an end to Social-Democratic traditions in the sphere of dividing the work between the Party organisations on the one hand and the trade union opposition and fractions in the trade unions on the other.

Ever since the Third Congress (1921) the Comintern has been fighting for the carrying out of the Bolshevik organisational principles in the Party structure of the C.I. sections. Since 1924, the C.I. sections have had undoubted successes in this field. The danger of imperialist wars and of attacks on the U.S.S.R., the collapse of the precarious capitalist stabilisation owing to the world economic crisis, the rise of the revolutionary movement—all these things make it essential for all sections of the C.I. to increase their membership, to retain and train the newly-made members, to stop the fluctuation of the membership, to intensify the fight against the reformists and the fascists, and to secure better preparation of the independent leadership of all activities of the workers, in spite of and against the reformists. For this it is necessary to liquidate the Social-Democratic traditions remaining in the Communist Parties, to reinforce the work in the reformist, Catholic and other mass reactionary trade unions, and to transfer the centre of gravity of Party and trade union work to the factories, forming new factory cells and improving the work of the existing ones.

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